

The Public Choice Approach To Politics Economists Of The Twentieth Century

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Beyond Neoclassical Economics Fred E. Foldvary 1996 This introduction to the main heterodox schools of economic thought examines their main concepts and their critiques of mainstream theory. The schools examined include Austrian economics, geo-economics, the Virginia school of political economy, feminist economics, humanist economics, institutional economics, and nondeterminist Marxism. The aim of these essays is to understand the ideas and methodology of these approaches, and also to explain why there are different approaches to economics, and how the various schools relate to each other.

The Economics of Politics James M. Buchanan 1978

Democracy and Welfare Economics Hans van den Doel 1993-07-22 This book is a fully revised and updated version of Hans van den Doel's Democracy and Welfare Economics. It presents the economic theory of political decision-making (otherwise known as new political economy, or public choice), providing students with an accessible and clear introduction to this important subject. The authors identify four different methods of decision-making by which the political process transforms the demands of individual citizens into government policy, and these are analyzed in turn with reference to

economic theory.

Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen Knut Wicksell 1896

Law and Economics Nicholas Mercurio 2012-12-06

The character of economic life] in a society is dependent upon, among 2 other things, its political-legal-economic institutional setting. Within that institutional structure, the individuals who comprise that society attempt to cooperate with one another to their mutual advantage so as to accommodate their joint utility-maximizing endeavors. In addition, these same individuals call upon certain societal institutions to adjust the conflicting claims of different individuals and groups. In this regard, a society is perceived as both a cooperative venture for mutual advantage where there are an identity of interests and, as well, an arena of conflict where there exists a mutual interdependence of conflicting claims or interests. The manner in which a society structures its political-legal-economic institutions 1) to enhance the scope of its cooperative endeavors and 2) to channel internal political-legal-economic conflicts toward resolution, shapes the character of economic life in that society. In contemplating the structure of its institutions intended to promote cooperation and channel conflict, a society confronts several issues. At the most general level an enduring

issue is how a society both perceives and then ideologically transmits (perhaps teaches or rationalizes), internally and/or externally, its perceptions of so-called "cooperative endeavors" and "arenas of conflict." There can be no doubt that the resultant structure of a society's institutions will reflect that society's perception as to what cooperation entails and what conflict constitutes.

Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie Anthony Downs 1968 English summary: It was Anthony Downs' objective to create a model dealing with voter and government behavior. In order to do so, he established goals which governments, parties and lobbyists as well as the voters can pursue. To motivate all those concerned, he introduced the self-interest axiom and called for rationality in order to attain these goals. With the help of marginal analysis, each voter determines his/her party differential, which will help to determine each voter's choice at the ballot box and to decide which party's rule will give him/her greater utility in the future. Downs describes how crucial the concept of ideology is to his theory. He maintains that a two-party democracy could not provide stable and effective government unless there is a large measure of ideological consensus amongst its citizens, and that political parties encouraged voters to be irrational by remaining vague and ambiguous. German description: Anthony Downs' inzwischen klassisches Demokratie-Modell des Wähler- und Regierungsverhaltens orientiert sich an der ökonomischen Theorie. Er nimmt an, dass politische Parteien und Wähler in der Verfolgung bestimmter, deutlich spezifizierter Ziele optimal handeln. So treffen die Wähler unter Ungewissheit über den Wahlvorgang und die zukünftige Regierungsbildung ihre Wahl nach dem mutmasslichen Nutzen. Die Regierung versucht, mit Hilfe der Manipulation des Budgets ihre Wiederwahl zu erreichen. Ideologien der Parteien auf der einen Seite, Interessengruppen auf der anderen stellen den Wählern bzw. der Regierung Informationen zur rationalen Entscheidungsfindung zur Verfügung. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Mehrparteiensysteme und Verhältniswahlrecht jedes Wahl-Kalkül unlosbar werden lassen. Auf die weiteren Folgerungen für Demokratie-Forschung und -Verständnis geht Downs im letzten Teil seines Werkes ausführlich

ein.

The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan James M. Buchanan 1999

The Economics of Politics Gordon Tullock 2005
The Economics of Politics is the fourth volume in Liberty Fund's The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock. This volume includes some of Gordon Tullock's most noteworthy contributions to the theory and application of public choice, which is a relatively new science that links economics and political action. This volume combines the best parts of two of his books, *Private Wants: Public Means* and *On Voting*, as well as his famous monograph *The Vote Motive*. The common thread of *The Economics of Politics* is the importance of the bond between *Homo politicus* and *Homo economicus*: they are the same species, each driven largely by self-interest in vigorous pursuit of such personal objectives as wealth, power, prestige, and income security within the confines of society. The Economics of Politics covers such diverse public choice topics as: the nature and origins of public choice, the power of using economic analysis to understand and predict the behavior of politically influenced markets, and an evaluation of voting rules and political institutions. Equally confident in both the normative and the positive branches of the discipline, and well-versed in the wide variety of institutions and practices of democracy throughout history, Tullock takes the reader on a journey that goes well beyond the conventional horizon of public choice. Gordon Tullock is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and University Professor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, the University of Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became *Public Choice* and remained its editor until 1990. Charles K. Rowley was Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University. He was also General Director of the Locke Institute.

The Political Economy of Environmental Policy
Bouwe R. Dijkstra 1999 This work asks why

market instruments have not been used to their full potential in environmental policy. It uses a public choice perspective to analyse the political economy of environmental policy, emphasising the role of interest groups which have blocked the introduction of market instruments.

Political Theory and Public Choice Anthony Downs 1998 This volume contains a selection of Anthony Downs' essays, written since the 1950s, on politics and political theory. The articles address such issues as democracy, public choice theory, rational political decision-making and political policy.

Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice Patrick Dunleavy 2014-06-03 First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Economics: Private and Public Choice James D. Gwartney 2014-02-04 **ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE**, Fifteenth Edition, reflects current economic conditions, enabling students to apply economic concepts to the world around them. The up-to-date text includes analysis and explanation of measures of economic activity in today's market. It also includes highlights of the recession of 2008-2009, and an in-depth look at the lives and contributions of notable economists. **ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE** dispels common economic myths. The text uses the invisible hand metaphor to explain economic theory, demonstrating how it works to stimulate the economy. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version.

The Political Economy of Bureaucracy Steven O. Richardson 2012-09-10 *The Political Economy of Bureaucracy* applies Public Choice theory and a complex systems view of government institutions to analyze policy implementation as an economic process. It addresses the common and vexing question of why managing federal agencies for results is so difficult by challenging traditional assumptions of institutional design and policy analysis. Using creative methods that focus on relationships that constrain the choices of executives and managers in a political hierarchy, the author reveals control and coordination as goals that are imperfectly achieved and often conflicting with one another. Despite decades of intense study, serious reform efforts and

impressive technological advances, the U.S. government remains a typical bureaucracy that fails to meet citizens' expectations. Clearly, policy analysis is missing something. The problem may rest with "machine" models of government. Rules, especially those governing expenditures, are assumed to be feasible and effective. Analysis of the federal government as a complex system of relationships between semi-autonomous agents helps explain the disconnect between policy and results. The solution is to roll back micro-management of ends and means; policymakers should focus on objectives and facilitate implementation by selectively relaxing constraints that prevent experimentation needed to determine the most effective methods. This book devotes unusual attention to the interaction between executive and legislative branches of government and between political appointees and career civil servants. Most studies of government policy take existing institutional structure for granted. Different conclusions emerge from this analysis by virtue of the systems view that accepts status quo hierarchies but questions the effectiveness of the rules that govern policy implementation. This book will be of interest to postgraduates and researchers focussing on Economic Theory, Public Choice, Institutional Economics and Political Science, as well as to those working in the public sector interested in Public Administration, Public Policy, and Organizational Behavior.

Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom

Peter J. Boettke 2020-06-26 This definitive book examines and engages with the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, along with the Bloomington School of Political Economy more generally. The contributors emphasize the continuing relevance of the Ostroms' work on collective action, self-governance, and institutional diversity for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities. This book's wide array of topics and approaches will be a valuable resource to readers in a variety of fields, including: political science, economics, philosophy, sociology, public administration, environmental studies, and political economy.

Institutional Economics and National

Competitiveness Young Back Choi 2011-09-14 This book offers a strong contribution to the

growing field of institutional economics, going beyond the question of why institutions matter and examines the ways in which different types of institutions are conducive to the enhancement of competitiveness and economic development. Adopting a variety of approaches, ranging from New Institutional Economics, Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy and Austrian Economics, to more traditional economic approaches, contributors examine the important issues of interest to development economics. This book asks whether democracy is a precondition for economic development, what the proper role of government is in the age of globalization and whether successful government led policies were the cause of South Korea's economic development. As well as these key questions, the book covers the issues of whether the government should rely on the market process to encourage economic development or must they interfere, and by what criteria one can judge a proposal for policies for economic prosperity. The book tries to make a contribution by introducing a variety of perspective, some argue in favour of industrial policies while others argue for a lesser role for the government and a greater entrepreneurial freedom. Some question the wisdom of promoting democracy as a necessary condition for economic development while others argue that political liberalization is the basis of lasting competitive edge of an economy. The book should be of great interest to students and researchers in need of a multi-perspective collection covering several approaches to the issues of institutional economics and national competition.

The Production and Diffusion of Public Choice Political Economy

Joseph C. Pitt
2004-01-26 This book is about is more than a subdiscipline within the field of economics---it is about a new field named "public choice political economy" that gradually evolved during the 1970s and 1980s at Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia. What is the field Public Choice Political Economy all about? How did it originate? Who were the main architects and builders? What values and work habits motivated the work? Finally, how did the facts about the development of public choice political economy stack up against what we know about science in general and how it has developed? The authors

of the essays included in this volume, originally came together in May of 2000 in Blacksburg to celebrate their scientific achievements and take pride in the regimen of research and the processes that brewed at the legendary Public Choice center in Virginia. This location provided what turned out to be a fortuitous combination of obscurity and rustic quiet for original thoughts and concentrated debates. Inspired by the pioneer attitudes of the Virginians and the dedication and work ethic of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, a core group of renegade social scientists broke new ground and started a revolution in thought. The big questions about economizing behavior, constitutional limitations on an overreaching bureaucracy and the possible design and redesign of institutions to harness self-interested behavior for the benefit of all are touched on and placed in historical context. The resulting public choice movement occurred first in economics and later extended to political science and beyond. This may have been one of the most important developments in twentieth century social science. The book concludes with Nobel laureate, James Buchanan's thoughts about what had transpired largely but not exclusively under his guidance. Other contributors include, Richard B. McKenzie, Geoffrey Brennan, Stephen Medema and Robert Sugden. Professors Pitt, Salehi-Isfahani and Eckel provide a useful introduction to this collection. These essays and comments were originally published in *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* in January of 2004 as an "invited volume." The book should be of great interest to historians of economics and the social sciences.

A Better Kind of Violence

Filip Palda
2016-11-25 Finally, the much awaited third book in Palda's "Social Calculus Trilogy" which covers all branches of economics. In *A Better Kind of Violence* Palda reveals how in recent years economists have learned to fuse economics and politics to produce a total theory of power. The most surprising conclusions are that politics tends towards a limited form of efficiency and that the advice of policy experts is irrelevant. The book draws on the three pillars of economics (individual maximization of utility, material constraints, the emergence of equilibrium) to show how economists have bypassed all other

social sciences in creating the greatest breakthrough in political thinking since Plato.

Public Choice Essays in Honor of a Maverick Scholar: Gordon Tullock

Price V. Fishback 2012-12-06 In May 1999, over 50 distinguished scholars from all over the world gathered to honor Gordon Tullock, one of the most prolific, original, and versatile scholars of his generation. Tullock is best known for his pioneering work in Public Choice, the study of how self-interested individuals interact with governments. Tullock's research in public choice has contributed to the understanding of the decisions made by elected officials and bureaucrats, as well as knowledge and how individuals and pressure groups both inside and outside the government seek to shape it. *Public Choice Essays in Honor of a Maverick Scholar: Gordon Tullock* includes contributions that were strongly influenced by Tullock's work. His influence on studies of governance is well illustrated by the nine papers in this volume. These papers and the discussion touch upon a broad array of aspects of public choice and of Tullock's research.

The political economy of the educational process

R.B. McKenzie 2012-12-06 The purpose of *The Political Economy of the Educational Process* is to demonstrate in an elemental way what economics can contribute to our understanding of how education occurs. Although in ways similar, the book is significantly different from other studies in the economics of education. Other works are primarily concerned with the effects which education (or, to use the economist's jargon, human capital) has on production, market efficiency, and the distribution of income. The central concern of this book is how and why the student goes about acquiring whatever human capital he wishes and how the institutional setting of the university influences the amount of human capital that the student acquires. This book deals with the learning process and, therefore, draws upon an earlier book written by Robert Staaf and myself. However, the "economic theory of learning," which Staaf and I developed earlier in very precise mathematical terms, is extended here through a fuller treatment of the political environment in which education occurs. A major concern of this work is to make the economic analysis easily understood by professional

educators and social scientists generally. To accomplish this objective, Chapter 2 develops for the non economicists the tools of analysis which are used throughout the book. Hopefully, by shying away from esoteric theory and by trying to make the discussion provocative and informative, the book 1. See Richard B. McKenzie and Robert J.

Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Gerald Gaus 2021-11-16 An updated and expanded edition of the classic introduction to PPE—philosophy, politics, and economics—coauthored by one of the field's pioneers *Philosophy, Politics, and Economics* offers a complete introduction to the fundamental tools and concepts of analysis that PPE students need to study social and political issues. This fully updated and expanded edition examines the core methodologies of rational choice, strategic analysis, norms, and collective choice that serve as the bedrocks of political philosophy and the social sciences. The textbook is ideal for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and nonspecialists looking to familiarize themselves with PPE's approaches. Starting with individual choice, the book develops an account of rationality to introduce readers to decision theory, utility theory, and concepts of welfare economics and consumer choice theory. It moves to strategic choice in game theory to explore such issues as bargaining theory, repeated games, and evolutionary game theory. The text also considers how social norms can be understood, observed, and measured. Concluding chapters address collective choice, social choice theory and democracy, and public choice theory's connections to voters, representatives, and institutions. Rigorous and comprehensive, *Philosophy, Politics, and Economics* continues to be an essential text for this popular and burgeoning field. The only book that covers the entirety of PPE methods A rigorous, nontechnical introduction to decision theory, game theory, and positive political theory A philosophical introduction to rational choice theory in the social sciences

The Elgar Companion to Public Choice

William F. Shughart 2001-01-01 'Many of the chapters of this handbook will be an indispensable addition to any course reading list in public choice, or public economics. They serve

as an excellent complement, integrating diverse lines of thoughts, to the core scholarly writings in the field. the essays are well-written and succeed, admirably, in accomplishing what a handbook must, making difficult and disparate material quite comprehensible to someone who wishes to become acquainted with the area.' - Harold M. Hochman, Lafayette College, US 'This is an extremely valuable insiders' account of what public choice is about. Presented in thirty well-reasoned and documented chapters, the book is a treasure trove for every political economist.' - Jürgen G. Backhaus, Maastricht University, the Netherlands This authoritative and encyclopaedic reference work provides a thorough account of the public choice approach to economics and politics. the Companion breaks new ground by joining together the most important issues in the field in a single comprehensive volume. It contains state-of-the-art discussions of both old and contemporary problems, including new work by the founding fathers as well as contributions by a new generation of younger scholars. the book reviews the literature of public choice, highlighting the common ground between all rational choice approaches to politics. It demonstrates the important impact of public choice on economics, political science, philosophy and sociology. It will be an indispensable source of reference for many years to the ideas, analytical methods and empirical research in the field.

Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics

James M. Buchanan 2002 This book contains a range of essays on topics in the emerging field of "constitutional political economy". This field of enquiry is strongly associated with the name of James M. Buchanan whose research program has been the point of departure for this field. The essays are a selection of those written by colleagues and researchers in the field to honor Buchanan on the occasion of his 80th birthday. They cover a wide range of topics but fall primarily into two sets: one set dealing with methodological aspects of the c.p.e. approach; the other dealing with specific applications in a variety of policy areas, ranging from "economic transformation" to monetary policy regimes to health care. One particular issue in the methodological area relates to the model of motivation used - and more especially, the role of

"morality" in economic and political behavior. The five essays on this topic make up one of the sections of the book, and justify reference to the issue in the volume's title.

Rethinking Public Choice Richard E. Wagner 2022-09-28 Innovative in its approach, Rethinking Public Choice reviews the concept of public choice since the 1950s post war period and the application of economics to political practices and institutions, as well as its evolution in recent years attracting contributions from political science and philosophy. Examining the growing variety of theoretical orientations on the topic, such as entangled political economy and additive political economy, the book provides new analytical insights into combining the old and new to establish a more unified political economy. Richard Wagner expertly highlights the key issues an entangled economy can bring, including incomplete information and its constant evolution as it reflects ever changing public choice ideas. Wagner seeks to extend the reach of public choice by distinguishing the formal idea of rationality that has dominated public choice from the immensely varied practice of human action that opens up now directions for public choice. This insightful approach will prove an excellent resource for academics and scholars of economics and political science, as well as those within the field of public administration as it offers an excellent blend of all subjects.

The Economics of Public Spending David Miles 2003-03-20 The Economics of Public Spending investigates the extent of government involvement in the economy, details its rational, and traces its historical record. The book unites articles previously published in Fiscal Studies, each one addressing a different area of expenditure and written by an economist specializing in that field. They describe both the data on public expenditure and the theory relevant to understanding the policy issues. A new introduction investigates the overall role of the public sector and discusses the general theory of public expenditure. In providing a detailed analysis of public expenditure, the book makes an important contribution to the economics literature. There are no other texts with this breadth of coverage or depth of analysis. Insights are provided into both the policy issues, cross-country comparisons of

expenditure, and alternative approaches to economic analysis. The chapters apply the tools of orthodox public finance, public choice, modern public economics, and game theory to reach a range of policy proposals and conclusions. These demonstrate the range and potential of economic analysis when applied to these important issues. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy Barry R. Weingast 2008-06-20 Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had many different meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of how the ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes for Marx; the study of the inter-relationship between economics and politics for some twentieth-century commentators; and for others, a methodology emphasizing individual rationality (the economic or "public choice" approach) or institutional adaptation (the sociological version). This Handbook views political economy as a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands, treating political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions. This Handbook surveys the field of political economy, with 58 chapters ranging from micro to macro, national to international, institutional to behavioral, methodological to substantive. Chapters on social choice, constitutional theory, and public economics are set alongside ones on voters, parties and pressure groups, macroeconomics and politics, capitalism and democracy, and international political economy and international conflict.

Inspiring Economics Bruno S. Frey 2002-01-01 I highly recommend this book to all economists. It is well written, informative and a pleasure to read. The first chapter, in particular, "Inspiring, Dismal or Boring Economics?" should be made required reading for all graduate students in economics, and even more so for their professors, especially at leading universities in the United States. Yew-Kwang Ng, *Journal of Economic Literature* Instead of ignoring the challenge to rational behaviour posed by several anomalies in behaviour, or abandoning rationality in the face of this challenge, Bruno Frey's *Inspiring Economics* provides a valuable extension of rational behaviour to incorporate

these anomalies. This is an exhilarating study that I strongly recommend to everyone, including those like myself, who believe that the importance of these anomalies are sometimes exaggerated. Gary S. Becker, Stanford University, US Bruno Frey is one of a number of modern economists who believe (as I do) that economics should be importing rather than exporting ideas from elsewhere in the social sciences. In these sparkling essays, he shows that rational choice theory is enriched and sometimes revised by taking account of non-monetary rewards and incentives. With Frey, economics once again becomes an inspiring behavioural science. Mark Blaug, University of London and University of Buckingham, UK Economics can be inspiring often taking a stand against convention, achieving challenging results, discussing unorthodox viewpoints and suggesting new policies. Bruno S. Frey illustrates what he perceives to be the inspirational quality of economics and how this differs from the type of economics studied in many academic institutions. He introduces insights into economics from a psychological perspective, dealing with issues such as transformation of anomalies, identification in democracy and crowding effects, and focuses on intrinsic motivation and how it is undermined. *Inspiring Economics* also looks at the integration of economics and politics, covering topics including popular initiatives and referenda, authoritarian nations and foreign aid, and the way in which the cost of war is reflected on the capital market. This groundbreaking empirical study of human motivation and behaviour will be a fascinating read for those interested in economics and economic theory.

The Vote Motive Gordon Tullock 1976 Label mounted on title page: Transatlantic Arts, Levittown, N.Y., sole distributor for the U.S. Includes index. Includes Party politics and bureaucracy in economic policy, by M. Perlman. Includes bibliographies.

Rational Choice Andrew Hindmoor 2017-09-16 Assuming no prior knowledge, this widely-used and critically-acclaimed text provides a clear introduction to, and uniquely fair-minded assessment of, Rational Choice approaches. The substantially revised, updated and extended new edition includes more substantial coverage of

game theory, collective action, 'revisionist' public choice, and the use of rational choice in International Relations.

Choosing in Groups Melvin J. Hinich 2015-01-12

This book is an introduction to the logic and analytics of group choice. To understand how political institutions work, it is important to isolate what citizens - as individuals and as members of society - actually want. This book develops a means of "representing" the preferences of citizens so that institutions can be studied more carefully. This is the first book to integrate the classical problem of constitutions with modern spatial theory, connecting Aristotle and Montesquieu with Arrow and Buchanan.

Theory of Public Choice James M. Buchanan 1972

Austrian Economics Steven Horwitz 2018-12-03

This book brings together emerging and established scholars to explore the insights that can be gleaned from applying Austrian economics to a range of different topics and a variety of related disciplines, from history to politics to public policy.

The Endogenization of Government Behaviour in Macroeconomic Models Bern C.J. van Velthoven 2011-12-22

In chapter 2 we concluded that the present public choice and marxist approaches to the study of political processes, as far as relevant for the analysis of economic policy making, are unsatisfactory, for reasons of incoherency, insufficient empirical support, and lack of specificity~ It was suggested that a different approach to the subject might be fruitful. To that purpose, we now turn our attention to the so-called interest function approach to the study of politico-economic phenomena, that has been developed by Van Winden (1983). See also Van Winden (1987), Van Velthoven and Van Winden (1986). Without paying too much attention to the specific conduct of and intricate relationships between voters, politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups, the interest function approach intends to combine valuable elements of the marxist and public choice analyses. According to Van Winden (1983, p. 12) "this means that in studying the interaction between state and private sector, attention should be paid to: - social classes, and the impact of class/power relationships on political and economic processes; - the way that social power structures

(involving the real control over state activities) are maintained or altered; - the relative autonomy of political processes (involving the state) and its consequences for, as well as its dependence on economic processes; - individual motivations; - the possibility of mathematical formalization. " Section 3. 2. will give a general introduction to the concepts and the line of argument of the interest function approach.

Economics of Public Choice New York 1975

James M. Buchanan Richard E. Wagner

2019-06-25 "A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan's many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory."- Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA "The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book."- Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USA This book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986.

Buchanan's receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to use logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarly community. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan's scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy. This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan's scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan's scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.

The Limits of Public Choice Lars Udehn
2002-09-11 Public choice has been one of the most important developments in the social sciences in the last twenty years. However there are many people who are frustrated by the uncritical importing of ideas from economics into political science. Public Choice uses both empirical evidence and theoretical analysis to argue that the economic theory of politics is limited in scope and fertility. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of political life, political scientists must learn from both economists and sociologists.

Greed, Chaos, and Governance Jerry L. Mashaw 1999-01-11 Public choice theory should be taken seriously--but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions. While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both

governmental capacity and the rule of law.

Political Economy in Macroeconomics Allan Drazen 2000-01 Allan Drazen focuses on the implications of political and economic outcomes rather than political and public choice per se limiting his coverage to macroeconomics.

Public Choice Analyses of American Economic History Joshua Hall 2019-01-25 This book is the third installment in a series of volumes looking at episodes in American economic history from a public choice perspective. Each chapter discusses citizens, special interests, and government officials responding to economic incentives in both markets and politics. In doing so, the book provides fresh insights into important periods of American history, from the Rhode Island's 1788 Referendum on the U.S. Constitution and the political influence of women's clubs in the United States. The volume features economic historians such as Ruth Wallis Herndon, junior public choice scholars such as Jayme Lemke and Leo Krasnozhon, and political scientists such as Michael Faber. This volume will be useful for researchers and students interested in economics, history, political science, economic history, public choice, and political economy.

Public Choice Theory: The characteristics of political equilibrium Charles K. Rowley 1993

Beyond Politics William C. Mitchell 1994-11-13 Traditional welfare economics has held that "market failures" are fairly common and that they are best addressed through the intervention of governments. In *Beyond Politics*, Professors Mitchell and Simmons present the traditional view and compare it to the modern theory of public choice, which emphasizes the actual rather than the ideal workings of governments. By reuniting the insights of economics with those of political science, the authors have produced a unified and powerful statement about the market process, property rights, contracts, and government. *Beyond Politics* offers an accessible and reliable introduction to these matters while significantly advancing our understanding of them.